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ABSTRACT. In order to achieve the overall objectives of the 
supply chain (SC), there have been seen many contradictions 
between the components and different levels, and these disorders 
may result in decreased strength and competitiveness.  
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 The main contradictions that are considered in this paper comprise 
inventory, pricing and marketing costs in an unlimited three 
echelon supply chain. The basics of the game theory make it a 
suitable and reliable tool for solving contradiction situations by 
considering all the levels and players’ goals. Initially, an unlimited 
three echelon supply chain, including S suppliers, M 
manufacturers, and K retailers, is considered in order to solve the 
aforementioned problem. Further on, a nonlinear mathematical 
cooperative model based on specific assumptions, game theory 
approach, Nash equilibrium definition, Pareto efficiency, and 
revenue sharing contract is proposed. Subsequently, the proposed 
model is employed in a numerical example, and the results are 
illustrated according to the genetic algorithm. Furthermore, the 
sensitivity of the proposed model is analysed using the design of 
experiment. Ultimately, the validation of the proposed cooperative 
model is assessed by the simulation. 
 
KEYWORDS: supply chain, game theory, coordination contracts, 
design of experiment, genetic algorithm, simulation.  
JEL classification: C15, C44, C68, M11, M21, O14. 
 
Introduction 
 
Forrester and his colleagues at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology developed 
many ideas and theories during the late 1950s that later became the cornerstones of supply 
chain management (hereafter SCM) (Mentzer, 2001; Mentzer et al., 2001; Blanchard, 2010). 
The concept of the supply chain means that many experts believe that competition is 
transferred from companies to chains (Jespersen, Larsen, 2005). Many scholars and experts 
gave different definitions of SCM that depend on their viewpoints and attitudes. The role and 
importance of SCM have faced many challenges and problems. Although a comprehensive 
model has not been explained, it should be indicated that the issues, such as, reviewing the 
theoretical foundations of information systems, marketing, financial management, logistical, 
and organizational relations, has been considered by many researchers (Wang el al., 2007; 
Amiri et al., 2012). There are many challenges that latent in supply chain concept. The 
decisions made in SCM are mainly concerning the flows between the chains stages. 
Therefore, many scholars express the challenges and problems that SCM have and tried to 
answer them (Chandra, Kamrani, 2004; Simchi Levi et al., 2004; Chopra, Meindel, 2007; 
Wisner et al., 2008; Amiri et al., 2012). 
The objective of SCM is to improve various activities and components to increase the 
overall benefits. Many decisions are made in different levels covering detailed and strategic 
decisions. The planning of important decisions in a multi echelon chain could affect all the 
levels and the SC as a whole (Stadtler, Kilger, 2007). If each level makes their inventory, 
pricing, and advertising decision without considering the other levels, the bullwhip effect will 
occur, and the competitiveness advantage decreases (Lee et al., 1997). In order to avoid such 
loss in SC, many coordination mechanisms have been introduced in the recent researches. 
There are many possible interactive coordination mechanisms that can occur between the 
different levels of a given supply chain (Esmaeili et al., 2009). By considering a multi echelon 
supply chain, many problems will occur in the absence of coordination. Considering the 
ownership and managerial independency at each level, different aims and plans will threaten 
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the overall profit. In today’s changing world, the different levels of the supply chain are very 
wide and varied; thus, the different models and approaches are rolling in planning and 
controlling the activities. In such situation, if the variety of products and services provided by 
SC increases, the information distortion will multiply the increase. The main purpose of SCM 
in the mentioned situation is to solve the levels contradictions. Some of the main and critical 
contradictions in different levels of SC are inventory, pricing and marketing cost decisions. 
As a case in point, the supplier (as the seller) intends to sell raw materials by the highest 
possible price; on the other hand, the manufacturer (as the buyer) urges to by the raw 
materials at the lowest plausible point. Similarly, the aforementioned scenario occurs while 
the manufacturer acts as seller and the retailer as buyer, considering the final product. In 
addition, these bargaining games are repeated during the negotiations regarding other 
variables including inventory, order quantity or marketing issues.  
In this research, these decision variables are considered in an unlimited three echelon 
SC, including S supplier, M manufacturer, and K retailer, while each manufacturer produces 
one specific good. The word unlimited specifies that the assumed supply chain is not 
restricted by one or more than one player at each stage, indicating that the proposed model is 
applicable for chains with numerous players performing as supplier, manufacturer or retailer. 
As previously mentioned, solving the contradictions among different levels of a chain 
engenders higher class of coordination and cooperation; thus, the total profit of a supply chain 
significantly increases. In virtue of tweaking the overall profit, game theory (henceforth GT) 
is applied as the main tool for coordinating the SC, based on revenue sharing contracts. Many 
researchers have considered this dilemma; nonetheless, our proposed model encompassing 
unlimited players at each stage, nonlinear demand function, gradual production rate and 
possible shortage at manufacturer level, endeavours to bring a novel approach among the 
literature. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. First, the literature review related to 
SCM and GT are provided. The assumptions and notation come afterwards, and the profit 
function for each level is formulated, subsequently considering Pareto efficiency, the supply 
chain’s overall profit function is modelled. Further on, the best response of each player related 
to the three main decision variables are calculated and the concavity of the proposed model is 
analysed by using the Nash equilibrium definition. Finally, a numerical example is proposed, 
and sensitivity analyses of the proposed model alongside with its validation are indicated by 
the simulation. 
 
1. Literature Review 
 
1.1 Supply Chain Coordination 
 
Nowadays, many companies have adopted a supply chain approach as their business 
strategy is to face the increasing pressure of customer-orientation and the growing trend of 
industrial globalization. However, SCM has been selected as a method for the improvement of 
competitive performance by merging internal operations and processes, as well as linking 
them with the external suppliers and customers (Tutuncu, Kucukusta, 2008; Amoozad 
Mahdiraji et al., 2012). A management construct cannot be used effectively by the 
practitioners and researchers if there is no common agreement on its definition. Now, SC has 
become dominant Paradigms in the field of business (Mentzer, 2001; Mentzer et al., 2001). 
Many researchers believe that the competition between the companies in the last decades 
changes to the competition between their supply chains (Jespersen, Larsen, 2005). According 
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to the definition, the supply chain encompasses all the parties that are involved directly or 
indirectly in fulfilling a customer request (Chopra, Meindel, 2007), including all activities 
which are performed until a raw material delivers as a final good for the customer (Gumus, 
Guneri, 2007). These sections may consist of producer, supplier, carriers, warehouses, 
retailers, and customers engaged in a new product development, marketing, executive 
operations, distribution, financial services, customer services, etc. The supply chain is a 
dynamic set of information flow, product, and capital in different levels, in which the 
customer is only engaged as an internal part. According to these definitions, the main 
objective of SC is to meet the needs of customers to their full satisfaction and create profit. 
Figure 1 shows a given supply chain (Amoozad Mahdiraji et al., 2012).  
 
 
Source: Jia et al., 2013.  
 
Figure 1. A Given Supply Chain 
 
Many contradictions between the components and different levels, in order to achieve 
the overall objectives of SC, have been seen, and these disorders may result in decreased 
strength and competitiveness. Coordination mechanism and contracts are one of the main 
drastic tools for decreasing the negative effects of the contradictions. Numerous kinds of 
coordination contracts exist, which are classified and revealed in Table 1. (Maomao, 2006; 
Nalla, 2008; Hezarkhani, Kubiak, 2010; Govindan, Nicoleta, 2011; Govindan et al., 2013; 
Amoozad Mahdiraji et al., 2014) 
 
Table 1. Coordination Contracts 
 
Description Contract Demand Type 
the buyer pays a fixed and quantity-independent price to the seller 
for the each purchased unit 
Wholesale 
Stochastic 
the seller promises to compensate the unsold quantities for the buyer  Buyback 
the downstream agent commits to return a pre-negotiated portion of 
its realized profits to the upstream agent 
Revenue 
Sharing 
the upstream agent rewards the downstream agent for every sold unit Rebate 
in contrast to Rebate contract Flexible 
by increasing the amount of the sale or buy, the upstream agent 
proposes a lower price 
Push and Pull 
lump-sum monetary transfers among the contracting agents which 
are independent from the amount of trade and used as the 
compensation and incentive alignment mechanisms 
Side Payment 
Deterministic/ 
Discrete and 
Continuous 
quantity-dependent unit prices Discount 
Stochastic/ 
Deterministic 
Source: Amoozad Mahdiraji et al., 2014. 
  
1.2 Game Theory Approach 
 
The main concept of game theory is originated by the mathematical researchers in 
Argentina and Japan in the 1940s. This group insisted in proofing their theories of 
mathematics and calculus. Following that, this mixed field of science found its applications in 
economy and industry and other practical sciences (Rasmusen, Blackwell, 2005). John Nash 
presented the equilibrium for cooperative situations in 1950 (Nash, 1950). He as well 
Supplier  Manufacturer Customer  
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developed a model for bargaining problems (Nash, 1950), and presented equilibrium point for 
the non-cooperative situations a year later (Nash, 1951). The essential elements of a game are 
players, actions, payoffs, and information. These are collectively known as the rules of the 
game, and the modeller’s objective is to describe a situation in terms of the rules of a game to 
explain what will happen in that situation. Trying to maximize their payoffs, the players will 
devise plans known as the strategies that pick actions depending on the information that 
arrives at each moment. The combination of strategies chosen by each player is known as the 
equilibrium. When given the equilibrium, the modeller can see what actions come out of the 
conjunction of all the players’ plans, and this tells him the outcome of the game (Rasmusen, 
Blackwell, 2005; Raut et al., 2014).  
When information transaction is not possible between the different players (different 
layers of the SC), by considering Nash definition, each player will stimulate competitors 
believes or best responses and while these believes are correct, Nash equilibrium will occur 
(Osborne, 2004). In a given two player game, the best responses are defined as (1). 
 
  iiiiiiiiiii SsSSUSSUSSB   ;),(),(:)( '  (1) 
iB  player i best response  
),( ii SS   strategy chosen by the players  
),( ii   two players of a game  
),( iii SSU   utility or payoff when a player opts strategy  
 
By considering the best response definition in continuous payoff functions, Nash 
equilibrium will be calculated as (2). Nash definition and equilibrium is applicable in famous 
situations, such as, Bertrand model of duopoly (Bertrand, 1883), a Cornet model of duopoly 
(Cournot, 1838), the final offer arbitration, and the problem of the commons (Gibbons, 2002). 
By the way, games which result in more than one answer and a unique point is not clearly 
identified, focal point will occur. Focal equilibrium takes place when players of a presumed 
supply chain tend to use it in the absence of communication, information and knowledge 
sharing, because it seems more natural or relevant. 
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(2) 
 
1.3 Related Researches 
 
In brief, the scholars have focused on the use of Nash equilibrium by applying profit 
sharing contract in many researches (Jaber et al., 2006; Zhang, 2006; Ying et al., 2007; Feng 
et al., 2007; Bai, Wang, 2008; Feng, 2008; Jiazhen, Qin 2008; Liu, Zhang, 2006; Wang et al., 
2009; Xu, Zhong, 2011).Other coordination contracts compounding with Nash and 
Stackelberg games are as well performed as suitable tools for SC coordination problems 
(Arda, Hennet, 2005; Leng, Parlar, 2010; Jia et al., 2013; Amoozad Mahdiraji et al., 2014).  
Many researches focused on the use of other kinds of coordinating contracts, such as, 
buyback, rebate, cost sharing, discount models, option contracts, and benefit sharing, in the 
multi echelon SC problems (Cachon, Lariviere, 1999, 2001, 2005; Xiao et al., 2007; Xiao, Qi, 
2008; Zhang, 2008; Chen, Xiao, 2009; Leng, Zhu, 2009; Yali, Zhanguo 2010; Zhang, Huang, 
2010; Nosoohi, Nookabadi, 2014; Heydari, 2014; Haidar et al., 2014; Xiao et al., 2014; Ming 
et al., 2014). 
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Moreover, some used Shapley value and Eliasberg model when confronting similar 
circumstances (Bahinipati et al., 2009; Leng, Parlar, 2009; Zhao et al., 2010). Finally, it 
should be demonstrated that the optimization tools, such as, queuing theory, Markov chain, 
backward induction, stochastic programming, and genetic algorithm, are as well employed in 
coordination and cooperation problems, especially in the incomplete information situations 
(Gupta, Weerawat, 2006; Zhen et al., 2006; Hennet, Arda 2008; Cachon, Kok, 2010; Kaviani 
et al., 2011; Ahmadi Rad et al., 2014; Zhang et al., 2014). 
 
2. Basics of Model 
 
2.1 Assumptions 
 
1. The unlimited supply chain consists of K retailer, M manufacturer, and S supplier. 
2. The products demand function depends on the price and the marketing cost 
advertisement which is continuous and nonlinear as presented in (3), where Alpha considers 
the negative price behaviour (Lee, 1993; Abad, 1994; Lee et al., 1996; Kim, Lee, 1998; Jung, 
Cerry, 2001, 2005; Esmaeili et al., 2009; Jia et al., 2013; Amoozad Mahdiraji et al., 2014).  
 
nn Mrn
CPkD ..


 
(3) 
nD  
demand for product n  
nr
P
 
final selling price of product n by retailer r  
nM
C
 
marketing cost for product n  
,,k
 
demand constant for price and marketing cost  
3. The shortages are allowed for the manufacturer; hence, the related cost will be 
considered during the shortage period. The total relative costs for the manufacturer, when 
produces are incrementally, are calculated as (4). (Oganezov, 2006; Chang, 2008; Pentico et 
al., 2009; Wang, Tang, 2009; Chakrabortty et al., 2010; Jia et al., 2013; Amoozad Mahdiraji 
et al., 2014).  
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(4) 
nh
C
 
manufacturer’s holding cost  
n
n
n
PC
D
1
 
production rate  
nr
Q
 
production quantity  
nB  
manufacturer’s shortage  
nB
C
 
manufacturer’s shortage cost  
nPC  
manufacturer’s production capacity  
 
4. Pricing, Inventory, and Marketing cost are the decision variables at each level of 
SC. Furthermore, the production unit cost, raw material price, and the wholesale price are 
determined by the negotiation between players of the supply chain.  
5. Each manufacturer sells a specific product to a specific retailer. However, the 
suppliers sell their raw material to any manufacturer when needed, depending on the bill of 
the material (BOM) and consuming rate (Jia et al., 2013; Amoozad Mahdiraji et al., 2014). 
6. Each player at any level of the supply chain has a reasonable behaviour (fully 
rational) and moves for higher profit and lower cost.  
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7. Players of SC make a decision cooperatively based on the game theory approach, 
Nash equilibrium, Pareto efficiency, and revenue sharing contracts.  
 
2.2 Notations 
 
Description Note Description Note 
Retailers’ Share R  Profit margin for each player 
G  
Manufacturers’ Share N  Wholesale price from manufacturer n
P
 
Each manufacturer’s Share 
'
n  
Suppliers’ Share S  
Each supplier’s Share 
'
s  
Each retailer’s Share 
'
r  
Holding Cost coefficient 
'
k
 
Retailer’s setup cost 
rns
C
 
Manufacturer’s production capacity nPC  Total revenue of each player 
TR
 
Supplier’s unit cost 
sS
C
 
Total cost of each layer TC
 
Supplier’s ordering cost 
oS
C
 
Profit function of each player Z
 
Manufacturer’s variable cost 
nS
C
 
Raw material usage constant k  
Ordering cost from s to n 
snO
C
 
Raw material price from s to n 
sP
C
 
 
2.3 Retailer Payoff Function 
 
A retailer confronts the holding and setup costs as well as the purchasing cost from the 
manufacturer. When coupled with any, the retailer should have a positive marginal sale to 
participate in the game. Finally, a retailer’s income involves the revenue achieved by selling 
final goods to the final customer. By considering the aforementioned issues, the retailers’ 
payoff function and its constraints are shown as (5). The first constraint implies that the final 
selling price from the retailer to the customer should be greater than the mass price paid to the 
manufacturer; the second and third constraint insist that demand should not be negative, or 
greater than the production capacity. Remark that 
nnn rnMr
QPCP ,,, note decision variables in this 
situation (Jia et al., 2013; Amoozad Mahdiraji et al., 2014). 
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(
(5) 
 
2.4 Manufacturer’s Payoff Function 
 
A manufacturer confronts holding, setup, ordering, and shortage costs, plus purchasing 
costs and the production cost. However, the revenue of selling the final product to the retailer 
in large scales is acquired by the manufacturer. By considering the aforementioned 
information, the manufacturer’s payoff function and its constraints are shown as (6). The first 
constraint implies that the mass price from the manufacturer to the retailer should be greater 
than the price paid for the raw materials; the second and third constraint insist that the demand 
should not be negative or greater than the production capacity. Remark that 
Sn Pnrn
CBQP ,,, note 
decision variables under these conditions (Jia et al., 2013; Amoozad Mahdiraji et al., 2014). 
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2.5 Supplier’s Payoff Function 
 
A supplier confronts holding, setup, ordering as well as the purchasing or acquiring 
raw material. In contrast, every supplier will gain revenue by selling raw materials to the 
manufacturers depending on their usage of production. By considering what was mentioned 
above, the suppliers’ payoff function and its constraints are shown as (7). The first constraint 
implies that the raw material selling price to the manufacturer should be greater than the 
procurement of raw material by the supplier; the second constraint insists that the demand 
should not be negative. Remark that 
Sn Prn
CQP ,, note decision variables under these 
circumstances (Jia et al., 2013; Amoozad Mahdiraji et al., 2014). 
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3. Cooperative Game Modelling  
 
By considering the revenue sharing coordination contract, Nash equilibrium definition 
as well as the given supply chain assumptions, the total profit (
SCZ
T ) will be calculated as (8), 
which sums the profit of each involved level containing retailers (
rZ
T ), manufacturers (
nZ
T ), 
and suppliers (
sZ
T ).  
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(8) 
The best share of each level and each player (best response) should be determined by 
the first order condition of the function regarding the raw material price and the wholesale 
price for the proposed profit function illustrated as (9).  
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(9) 
If the equations mentioned in (9) are solved simultaneously, the optimal share of each 
level as well as each player is demonstrated as (10). 
H. Amoozad Mahdiraji,  
E.K. Zavadskas, S.H.R. Hajiagha 
141 ISSN 1648 - 4460  
Business Modelling Techniques and Predictive Analytics  
 
TRANSFORMATIONS IN BUSINESS & ECONOMICS, Vol. 14, No 2 (35), 2015 
***
'
'
*
'
* 1;
]..3[2
..2
;
..3
RNS
n r
nrn
n r
nrn
N
n r
nrn
n
n
R
kQD
kQD
kQD
D
n
n
n
 





 
 
 

 
For each level 
(10) 
MKN
S
s
R
r
N
n
*
'
*
'
*
' ;;





 
 
For each player 
By calculating the determinant of the Hessian matrix of each player, regarding its 
decision variables, the authors of this article conclude that the model is concave to its decision 
variables; accordingly, the optimal solution for the proposed model is accessible. Each player 
in the given SC will take the best decision during a game. As the reasonable behaviour of each 
player and Nash best response principle, the best decisions for each player in the three 
echelons SC will be to conclude by the derivation of the payoff function to the decision 
variables. The first order condition of each payoff function is used for the best response and 
by simultaneously solving the equations using MATLAB software, the results are garnered. 
The best responses for the retailers are uncovered as (11). 
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 Incidentally, the best responses for the manufacturers are witnessed as (12). 
n
nosn
snrn
n
rnnn
M
s
sssSnnRnBnN
M
s
sSs
M
s
snNsRn
r
QEB
kCkPkCE
CCCoCD
Q
..
)]...()..()...[(
)].())).((()..[(.2
*
1
'
11*











 
(12) 
By considering the SC total profit function as the objective function and supposing 
each best response as a constraint, the final nonlinear coordinated model of the proposed 
supply chain is figured in (13). The objective function is based on maximizing the SC total 
profit by considering each level’s optimal share of it. The total profit function is based on the 
sum of all the players’ objective function in all the levels. The first three constraints present 
the optimal share of each level on the basis of equation noticed in (10). The last three 
constraints indicate that each player acts rationally and the demand always exists, coupled 
with the final price is greater than mass price; moreover, the mass price is greater than the raw 
material purchasing cost paid for the each product by the manufacturer. Other constraints are 
based on the Nash definition and present the best response for each player regarding their 
decision variables. 
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4. Numerical Example 
 
Considering the proposed model mentioned above, regarding the validation and 
sensitivity analysis, a three echelon supply chain, including: 2 suppliers, 2 manufacturers, and 
2 retailers, is assumed. Table 2 indicates the numerical amounts of parameters in the proposed 
supply chain. First of all, the different experiments are identified, then the coordinated model 
is solved by Meta heuristic methods, subsequently the sensitivity analysis of the proposed 
model based on nonlinear parameters is determined; finally, the validation of the model is 
examined by simulation. 
Jia et al. (2013) and Amoozad Mahdiraji et al. (2014) used the same numerical 
example based on Stackelberg and Coalition game. The first research considered and 
compared three types of leadership and concluded that retailer leadership will beget the 
highest profit for the supply chain. Regarding the second research consisting of channel 
integration and proposed coalition best responses, the profit achieved from the coalition was 
higher than the decentralization and leadership methods. In this new research, a coordinated 
SC, via which all levels are cooperating upon revenue sharing contract, is considered. 
Eventually, the authors conclude that the profit achieved by the coordination contract does not 
outweigh the other methods based upon the given numerical example.  
 
Table 2. Input Parameters 
 
Par Amount Par Amount Par Amount Par Amount 
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Source: Jia et al. (2013) and Amoozad Mahdiraji et al. (2014). 
 
Between several types of parameters performed in the coordination model and for the 
sensitivity analysis the three constants, including k,, , which are the basis of nonlinear 
functions in the proposed model, are opted. The lower and upper bound of these three 
elements is reflected in Table 3. 
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Table 3. Parameters class limit 
 
Parameter Min Max 
  1.2 1.25 
  0.05 0.15 
k  3000 4000 
Source: Jia et al. (2013) and Amoozad Mahdiraji et al. (2014). 
 
By using k2 design of experiment (hereafter DOE) technique, based on three nonlinear 
parameters noticed above and including one central point in each block )12( 3  , 9 different 
experiments are designed by using MINITAB 16.5 software as shown in Table 4. These 
experiments are the basis of sensitivity analysis and the model validation tests. 
 
Table 4. Design of Experiment 
 
Experiments Alpha Beta K 
1(Central) 1.225 0.1 3500 
2 1.2 0.15 3000 
3 1.25 0.05 3000 
4 1.25 0.05 4000 
5 1.25 0.15 4000 
6 1.25 0.15 3000 
7 1.2 0.05 4000 
8 1.2 0.15 4000 
9 1.2 0.05 3000 
Source: Jia et al. (2013) and Amoozad Mahdiraji et al. (2014). 
 
The cooperative proposed model in this research is NP hard type and is not solvable 
by the deterministic methods. Even Lingo global solver, AIMS nonlinear, and FMINCON and 
FSOLVE in MATLAB software were not able to perform the model; accordingly, the Meta 
heuristic methods are used. The Genetic algorithm (henceforward GA) optimization tool in 
MATLAB software was applied in this part of the research for this matter. After defining and 
coding decision variables, parameters, and nonlinear objective function and constraints in GA 
OPTIMSET, lower bound, upper bound, initial solution, and other essentials are coded below. 
 
A= [-1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0; 0 -1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0]; 
b= [0 0]; 
Aeq=[0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0; 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0; 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 1; 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0; 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0; 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.06 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0; 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.06 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0]; 
Beq= [1 6 4.5 63 75 1 1]; 
LB= [63 75 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 63 75 6 4.5]; 
UB= [INFINFINFINFINFINF 15 15 INFINF 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 63 75 6 4.5]; 
X0= [70 80 5 5 2 2 12 12 50 50 0.5 0.6 0.3 0.4 0.3 63 75 6 4.5]; 
Options = gaoptimset (‘plotfcns’, {@gaplotbestf},’display’,’iter’); 
[X fval]=ga(@tzsc,19,A,b,Aeq,beq,LB,UB,@contzsc,options); 
 
Each experiment mentioned in Table 4 was performed 250 runs in GA, and the results 
are presented in Table 5; moreover, each level’s share besides the player’s profit is 
represented as well. In order to clarify, the two sample experiment figures in GA method are 
denoted in Table 5. 
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Table 5. Coordinated model results by GA 
 
Experiment TZSC Manufacturer’s Profit Supplier’s Profit Retailer’s Profit 
1 389.0 100.36 285.14 3.89 
2 429.0 160.45 261.69 4.29 
3 420.0 126.00 285.60 4.20 
4 52.0 24.44 5.36 21.84 
5 402.0 8.04 385.92 4.02 
6 404.0 14.14 383.80 4.04 
7 527.0 221.34 300.92 5.27 
8 414.0 44.30 339.48 24.84 
9 387.0 207.43 176.09 3.87 
     
Experiment 1 Experiment 2 
  
 
Source: created by authors.  
 
The main and interactive effects of the cooperation model for the three critical 
elements are calculated by MINITAB 16.5 software and are illustrated in figures of Table 6. 
Alpha and K directly affect the chain profit and Beta effects unfavourably. Coupled with all 
the three parameters comprise the interactive effects with each other.   
 
Table 6. Parameters Effects 
 
Main Effect Interaction Effect 
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Main Effect Coefficient Interaction Effect Coefficient 
Alpha 77.911-  -59.8 Alpha*Beta 101.25 50.62 
Beta 65.75 32.88 Alpha*K -123.75 -61.87 
K -61.25 -30.6 Beta*K 52.75 26.37 
Source: created by authors.  
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Verification of the proposed model is basically accessible by considering the 
assumptions of the models. Thus, the authors of this article have designed a simulated supply 
chain by the use of ARENA software based on data from the numerical example mentioned 
above. The simulated model based on ARENA software is shown in Figure 2, which is based 
on random marketing cost and random retailer price for the each retailer. By this 
randomization, the demand of each product is computable; therefore, the other decision 
variables will be reached by the best response of cooperative game, depending on the Nash 
equilibrium definition.  
 
 
Source: Jia et al. (2013) and Amoozad Mahdiraji et al. (2014). 
 
Figure 2. ARENA Cooperative Simulated Model 
 
The simulated model was performed 100 runs for each type of experiment, and the 
results are given in Table 7. As the result demonstrates, the overall profit of the supply chain 
by using the proposed cooperative model is similar to the total profit of SC based on the 
ARENA simulation in each experiment. The SC total profit is always between the upper and 
lower bound of the confidence limit. 
 
Table 7. Proposed Model Validation Results 
 
Experiment SC Total Profit by GA SC Total Profit by ARENA Min CL Max CL 
1 389.0 358.63 308.81 408.45 
2 429.0 419.38 383.44 455.32 
3 420.0 408.52 362.68 454.36 
4 52.0 500.50 433.24 567.76 
5 402.0 385.38 332.62 438.14 
6 404.0 416.95 376.01 457.89 
7 527.0 582.44 514.90 649.98 
8 414.0 373.78 316.67 430.89 
9 387.0 453.05 390.23 515.87 
Source: created by authors.  
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Finally, the authors examined the validation of the simulation model by using extreme 
points for each decision variable. The verification of simulated model was tested. In order to 
endorse this contention and as an illustration, the authors examined the model at the lowest 
and highest possible price ),0(  for the retailer to check the behaviour of the model. The 
results of this situation are presented in Table 8, which indicates that while the final product 
price increases, subsequently the profit of each level and plus the overall profit increases.  
 
Table 8. Results for Extreme Final Price of the Products by Retailers 
 
Players Maximum Average 
Manufacturers’ Profit 2098 
Retailers’ Profit 9616 
Suppliers’ Profit 5007 
Supply Chain’s overall profit 16721 
Source: created by authors.  
 
 
In order to clarify, the behaviour of the simulated model was tested, while the raw 
materials were priceless, and the results are presented in Table 9, which indicates that whilst 
the raw material are free, the supply chain’s overall profit increases exponentially. It should 
be noticed that the other situations were as well analysed, and it was eventually concluded that 
the proposed model alongside with the simulated one is performing correctly.  
 
Table 9. Results While the Raw Material is Priceless by Supplier 
 
Players Maximum Average 
Manufacturers’ Profit 5640 
Retailers’ Profit 3622 
Suppliers’ Profit 4000 
Supply Chain’s overall profit 13262 
Source: created by authors.  
 
Jia et al. (2013) and Amoozad Mahdiraji et al. (2014) solved the similar problem by 
using Stackelberg and Nash equilibrium methods. Considering this new proposed model, the 
situation of the supplier’s raw material price (
pC ) and manufacturer’s mass selling price for 
the retailer ( nP ) are comparable among trio aforementioned methods, and the results are 
illustrated in Table 10. Nonetheless, other decision variables are not comparable, thus, are not 
considered.   
 
Table 10. Comparing decision variables 
 
pC  S N C nP  S N C 
Stackelberg (S)  = < Stackelberg (S)  = < 
Nash (N)   < Nash (N)   < 
Cooperative (C)    Cooperative (C)    
 
Source: created by authors.  
 
As Table 10 indicates, the raw material and the mass selling price are equal between 
Stackelberg and Nash equilibrium. In addition, this new coordination proposed model leads to 
the minimum amount of raw material and mass selling price decision variables compared with 
other methods.  
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Conclusions 
 
To sum up, in this research, the coordination in multi echelon supply chains were 
considered, in which the revenue sharing contract between several types of contracts based on 
the game theory approach was used as a suitable tool for coordinating pricing, inventory and 
marketing expenditure policies as three main decision variables. The authors of this article 
proposed a coordinated model and examined it by the use of simulation and ARENA 
software. The simulation preformed correctly, and the verification of the coordination model 
was testified and guaranteed. 
In spite of the recent mathematical achievement regarding supply chain coordination, 
there are many determining factors missing while performing them in the actual situations. As 
a case in point, the proposed model was assumed to employ in Iranian Sugar industry chain; 
however, the lack of informational and cultural infrastructures impeded the procedure. Hence, 
the authors of this article propose a preparation process prior to using the proposed 
coordination method. First, cater the informational, relational, and cultural requirements, 
afterwards, analyse the chain, players, situation, availability of information, and so forth to 
realize and employ the prominent game theory approach and related tools. Eventually, 
determine the demand and other parameters and apply the most suitable coordination contract.  
The situations and assumptions used in this paper are the key for the future researches. 
Considering more levels in the supply chain will lead the researchers to a comprehensive 
model of coordination in the future. In addition, as the competency of information and sharing 
in different levels of supply chain seems to be impossible in reality, applying the incomplete 
or imperfect game theory approaches, such as, signalling or Nash Bayesian game, will solve 
this problem and attain to more realistic options in the future. The coordination mechanism 
employed in this paper is based on revenue sharing contract. It is worth noting here that other 
kind and coordination options, such as: profit sharing, buyback, and option contract, are all 
possible solution for this matter. Ultimately, OPT QUEST application in ARENA software is 
a suitable tool to estimate the best amounts of nonlinear model parameters; therefore, by 
identifying the optimal amount of the proposed model parameters the optimal solutions will 
be acquirable. 
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DAUGIAPAKOPIŲ TIEKIMO GRANDINIŲ KOORDINAVIMAS TAIKANT LOŠIMŲ TEORIJOS 
METODĄ 
 
Hannan Amoozad Mahdiraji, Edmundas Kazimieras Zavadskas, Seyed Hossein Razavi Hajiagha 
 
SANTRAUKA 
 
Siekiant įvykdyti visus tiekimo grandinės (TG) tikslus, buvo pastebėta daugybė prieštaravimų tarp 
komponentų ir skirtingų pakopų, o šie trukdžiai gali sumažinti svarumą ir kompetenciją. Šiame straipsnyje 
aptariami tokie pagrindinai prieštaravimai, kaip inventorius, kainodaros ir rinkodaros sąnaudos neribotoje trijų 
pakopų tiekimo grandinėje. Lošimų teorijos pagrindai daro šį metodą tinkamą ir patikimą, sprendžiant 
prieštaringas situacijas, atsižvelgus į visas pakopas ir žaidėjų tikslus. Tam, kad būtų galima išspręsti minėtas 
problemas, pirmiausia reikia atsižvelgti į neribotą trijų pakopų tiekimo grandinę, kurioje yra S tiekėjų, M 
gamintojų ir K mažmenininkų. Remiantis tuo, siūlomas netiesinis matematinis kooperatinis modelis, grindžiamas 
atitinkamomis prielaidomis, lošimo teorijos metodu, Nasho ekvilibriumo apibrėžimu, Pareto efektyvumo ir 
pajamų pasiskirstymu. Tada pasiūlytas modelis pritaikomas skaitmeniniame pavyzdyje, o rezultatai iliustruojami 
pagal genetinį algoritmą. Paskui siūlomo modelio jautrumas analizuojamas planuojant eksperimentą. Galiausiai 
pateikto kooperatinio modelio patikrinimas yra vertinamas pagal modeliavimą. 
 
REIKŠMINIAI ŽODŽIAI: tiekimo grandinė, lošimų teorija ir koordinavimo sutartis, eksperimento planavimas, 
genetinis algoritmas, modeliavimas.  
 
 
